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STABILIZATION OF THE DIVIDING WALL AT A DRINKING WATER 
RESERVOIR 
 
Ingo Fox, P.E., Senior. Associate, Malcolm Pirnie, New York, USA 






The Reservoir is a component of the water supply system of a major city in the northeastern United States. The reservoir receives 
water conveyed by aqueducts and pressure tunnels from several watershed reservoirs. It is a balancing reservoir that regulates 
water flow and maintains the elevation head needed for the water tunnel distribution system to the south of the reservoir, which 
services the city inhabitants. The reservoir water surface is approximately 90 acres, and is contained by a man-made rim earth 
embankment, 40 feet in average height. The reservoir, which has an oval shape, is lined with a paneled concrete slab and is divided 
into an east and west basin of about equal size by a concrete dividing wall that traverses the reservoir along its longer axis. The 
wall, completed in 1916, stands 45 feet tall and has a 34.7 feet wide base. A by-pass aqueduct was built within the wall. After 
about eighty years of uninterrupted operation, the basins were cleaned of accumulated sediments. The paper describes the stability 
issues of the dividing wall during cleaning the basins. The original wall design did not account for dewatering one basin while the 
other remains in service with the uplift pressures developed in the foundation since start of first operation in 1917. The stability of 
the wall had to be improved in order to make possible the complete draining of one basin while the other remains fully operational. 
Although, initially, post-tensioned anchors into bedrock were considered to increase the wall stability against unbalanced water 
thrusts, additional assessments of the foundation material lead, instead, to the use of a temporary well-point dewatering system 
installed along the full length of the wall 20 feet into the underlying Glacial Till. The wellpoints were used to reduce uplift 
pressures under the wall base. The paper describes the stabilizing and monitoring procedures adopted during dewatering. It 
describes the analyses and monitoring of safe drawdown rates of the reservoir basins to prevent failure of the rim embankment 
slopes. It also describes in detail the designs, new factors of safety and test results, and construction of permanent stabilizing mass 
concrete buttresses that provide the necessary passive resistance for future dewatering of either basin for maintenance, cleaning 
and/or additional future construction. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION AND SITE DESCRIPTION 
 
The reservoir is located near a major northeastern 
metropolitan center and was built between the years 1908 
and 1915. The reservoir is used to balance variations in the 
supply of water from other reservoirs. It is an essential 
component of that city’s water supply system. The reservoir 
water surface is approximately 90 acres, and is contained by 
a man-made earth embankment. The approximately 40-foot 
high embankment dam encloses the reservoir and was 
constructed of local material removed during the excavation 
to form the reservoir basins. The reservoir is lined with a 
paneled concrete slab and is divided by a concrete dividing 
wall into an east and west basin of about equal size. The 
reservoir depth when full is 36.5 ft.  
 
After 80 years of continuous operation it was determined that 
as much as 4 to 6 inches of soft sediments had accumulated 
in the reservoir bottom. To maintain water quality it was 
decided to clean both basins one at a time. The dividing wall 
had to be permanently raised before the emptying of any one 
basin could proceed. 
 
Prior to 1998, the 
basins of the reservoir 
had never been fully 
emptied since the 
initial filling of the 
reservoir around 
1917. It was 
recognized that the 
rate of drawdown of 
the reservoir could 
create potential sliding 
failure of the earth rim 
embankment, and 
unequal levels of 
water in the reservoir 
basins could lead to 
instability of the 
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Before the emptying of the basins in 1998 there was also 
concern regarding uplift of the reservoir’s bottom slabs. 
However, after careful monitoring during the emptying of the 
basins for the reservoir cleaning, it was concluded that slab 
uplift was not a concern at the adopted reservoir drawdown 
rates. No slab uplift was observed from daily high resolution 
side-scan monitoring during drawdown performed from a small 
floating vessel during drawdown. 
 
The stability of the rim embankment was achieved by limiting 
the drawdown rate of the basins whereas the stability of the 
dividing wall was controlled by an active foundation 
dewatering system installed along the wall. Stability of the 
embankment and dividing wall was monitored around the clock 
during basin dewatering and empty conditions by 
instrumentation installed for that purpose. 
 
 
SITE GEOLOGY  
 
The reservoir site is located within the Manhattan Prong of 
the New England Upland region of the Appalachian 
Highland Physiographic Province. Before the construction of 
the reservoir, basal glacial soil deposits at the site consisted 
of substantial thickness of relatively unsorted sand, gravel 
and clayey-silt with frequent cobbles and boulders randomly 
distributed in the material. The glacial till material was 
deposited primarily during the most recent glacial 
advance/retreat designated as the Wisconsin glacial stage. 
Underlying the till is igneous, intrusive bedrock, known as 
the Yonkers Granite. The rock is of widely variable 
composition and commonly shows strong gneissic (light and 
gray banding of minerals) characteristics. The average 
thickness of the dense basal till under the bottom of the 
reservoir varies from 60 to 80 feet. The original natural 
ground water level at the reservoir was low. However, 80 
years of full reservoir operation has created a ground water 
dome fully saturating the materials underlying the reservoir 
and its vicinity. Most of the natural drainage of the reservoir 
subsurface is toward the river valley to the south-east about 
250 feet below. 
 
 
EXPLORATION OF DIVIDING WALL SUBSURFACE 
 
The mass concrete dividing wall is 2,750 feet in length and 
runs from the uptake building on the north side to the 
downtake building on the south side of the reservoir. The 
wall, symmetrical along its vertical axis, was constructed out of 
concrete in monoliths, typically about 30 feet in length. Vertical 
joints between monoliths are keyed and water-stopped with 
metal strips. A circular by-pass aqueduct, twelve feet in 
diameter was cast within the wall near its base. The wall has a 
base width of 34.7 ft and its original height was 36.5 ft. Before 
proceeding with the emptying of the basins, it was necessary 
to investigate the nature of the foundation materials, depth to 
bedrock and the uplift conditions under the wall base in order 
to establish the variables controlling its stability. For this 
purpose five sections along the wall were selected. Drillholes 
were advanced through the sides of the wall, approximately 
10 ft from its centerline, on opposite sides several feet into 
the underlying Glacial Till foundation, Fig.2.  
The drillholes were 6 inches in diameter and were drilled 
from a drilling rig mounted on a floating barge. All 
equipment, including the sectional floats, drill rig, casings, 
supplies and tools, were steam cleaned and sprayed with 
chlorine solution prior to being placed in the reservoir or 
transported to the barge. Other measures required for the 
protection of water quality included the use of propane fuel 
and non-petroleum based lubricants. Drilling water was 
recirculated and suspended concrete and soil allowed to settle 
out. The drill spoils were brought to shore for disposal. An 
absorbent boom was placed at the front of the barge around 
the drill casing.  
 
Three of the drillholes, one at the north side, one at the center 
and one at the south side of the wall, were taken down to 
bedrock, see Fig. 2. The need to know the bedrock depth and 
its quality stemmed from the initial thought of using post-
tensioned anchors to increase the wall stability. Because of 
the gravel and cobbles present in the Glacial Till, only 
disturbed samples were recovered for index properties and 
grain size distribution analyses. The sieve analyses showed, 
typically, that the Glacial Till under the wall base had fines 
content, soil particles smaller than 0.074 mm (No. 200 mesh) 
between 20 and 40%, and of low plastic index. The Glacial 
Till encountered directly under the wall was very dense 
comprised of boulders, gravel, sand and silt with some clay 
and was similar to materials encountered in prior 


























Fig. 3. Dividing Wall and New Extension 
explorations and representative of the Glacial Till confirming 
that the wall was founded directly on it. 
 
Piezometers were installed in each boring at the contact 
between the wall base and the foundation. In the deep 
drillholes a second piezometer was installed at depth. The 
piezometers were of electric vibrating-wire type. The 
selection of piezometer type and their purpose was to 
measure uplift pressures and its changes under the wall base 
with a quick response device. The deep piezometers were 
installed to establish piezometric heads at depth and 
hydraulic gradients in the Glacial Till. Before draining the 
basins and wall stabilization implementation, drawdown tests 
of the basins were performed to El. 278 ft, approximately 12 
feet below the average operating level of the reservoir, to 
obtain hydraulic head response in the foundation material 
and magnitude of change of the uplift pressures under the 
wall. The drawdown tests were also used to calibrate the 
finite element seepage model that encompassed the reservoir, 
rim embankment and foundation. 
 
It was established that the piezometric response was 
relatively rapid to changes of reservoir level and that in 
general the hydrostatic heads in the Glacial Till under the 
base of the wall are 30% to 40% lower than the hydrostatic 
head of the free standing water in the reservoir. Subsequent 
investigations of additional observation wells along the 
length of the wall, and installation of piezometers under the 




DIVIDING WALL EXTENSION 
 
The removal of sediments and the cleaning of the reservoir 
were undertaken in compliance with a stipulation agreement 
with the Department of Health. However, before performing 
the cleaning of the basins, the dividing wall had to be raised. 
The raising from its original top elevation 291.5 ft was 
necessary to be able to operate the reservoir at its maximum 
water level of El. 295 ft, above the original wall top 
elevation, during the period of time when one basin is out of 
service for cleaning. The wall was permanently extended in 
height to El. 300 ft with a reinforced concrete extension 8 
feet wide by 8.5 feet high (Fig. 3). This work was completed 
in 1997 after which the basins were cleaned in the dry, one at 
a time, in the Winter/Spring 1997/98 and fall of 1998, 
respectively. Subsequently both basins were again fully 
drained, one at a time, to construct the dividing wall 
stabilizing buttresses. The construction of permanent 
stabilizing buttresses along both sides of the dividing wall 
toes was necessary to increase the wall stability for future 
dewatering of basins without the use of the active foundation 
dewatering system, described in detail in the next Section, 
used during cleaning of the basins in 1998. The buttresses act 
as a passive system by providing additional weight and 
lateral resistance against sliding due to unbalanced water 
levels in the reservoir basins. Detailed description and 
purpose of the buttresses is described in subsequent Sections. 
Construction of the west basin buttress was done in the 
autumn of 1999 and the east basin buttress was completed in 
the spring of 2000.  
STABILIZATION OF THE WALL DURING CLEAN-UP 
 
The original dividing wall, constructed around 1912, was 
built on pre-existing very dense Basal Glacial Till, which is 
about 60 ft in thickness overlying Gneissitic Bedrock. The 
formation of the reservoir caused the buildup of the 
groundwater level in the area. This buildup created uplift 
pressures under the wall that lowered the original factors of 
safety against sliding under unbalanced water conditions 
between the two basins to less than one.  
 
Under unequal basin water levels, the dividing wall is subject 
to unbalanced lateral water thrusts that need to be resisted by 
frictional resistance along the wall base. The net excess 
horizontal water thrust increases as the unbalanced water 
levels between the two basins gets larger. Because the 
frictional resistance derived from effective contact stresses 
due to gravitational forces acting at the wall base were not 
sufficient to meet the necessary factors of safety against 
sliding, and also to maintain the resultant of all forces close 
to or within the middle-third of the wall’s base, it became 
necessary to investigate methods that would increase the 
normal effective stress at the base of the wall. Based on the 
index properties of soil laboratory tests of samples recovered 
from under the wall base it was decided to treat the 
foundation formation as a purely frictional material with no 
cohesion. The adopted friction angle for base-shear failure 
was 35 degrees. 
 
The increase in normal force at the wall base can be achieved 
by (1) adding an external force to the wall, such as vertical 
post-tensioned anchors or (2) the reduction of hydrostatic 
uplift pressures.  
 
Initially, it was considered to increase the stability to the wall 
by installing post-tensioned high capacity tendons anchored 
into the underlying bedrock on average about 70 feet below 
the base. Calculations indicated that three 675-kip anchors at 
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obtain an acceptable factor of safety against sliding. The 
length of the anchors was to be approximately 140 feet. The 
total amount of post-tensioned anchors required would have 
been 300. However, based on grain size distribution analysis 
of samples obtained from the wall foundation investigations, 
together with the calculation of exit hydraulic gradients from 
underseepage flow net analyses, and uncertainties about the 
behavior of the bottom slab regarding their uplift near the 
wall on the dewatered basin, it was concluded that the 
foundation material was susceptible to piping of its fine 
fraction. The piping potential would have created foundation 
undermining leading to wall tilting and greatly decreasing the 
usefulness of the anchors if installed. Although the post-
tensioned anchor solution was regarded as a permanent long-
term stabilization measure, the risk of foundation 
undermining was regarded too high. Therefore, to attain the 
necessary wall stability, in the short term, it was resolved to 
reduce the hydrostatic uplift forces instead. The investigation 
of these uplift pressures and their effect, on the dividing wall 
stability was extensively studied starting in the fall of 1995. 
The wall has at present 12 permanent monitoring sections, 
about 220 feet apart, where uplift conditions under the wall 
were measured. The observation wells consist of open 
standpipes and electric-type piezometers. The open 
standpipes were furnished with pressure transducers lowered 
to the bottom of the pipes for automatic remote reading. The 
transducers and electric-type piezometers were read at 
remote readout units connected to data loggers installed in 
the uptake and downtake buildings at each end of the wall. 
 
Based on these measurements, the results of two limited 
drawdown tests and the reduction of uplift obtained at three 
test sections along the wall using wellpoints, an ejector-
vacuum pumped wellpoint system was arrived at and 
constructed. The system consisted of 457 ejector wells, at 6 feet 
on center, 20 feet deep into foundation ground under the 
centerline of the wall. The wellpoints were installed in 6-inch 
diameter holes drilled from the top of the wall. This 
arrangement became the active uplift pressure reduction system 
used to maintain wall stability during the time the basins were 
cleaned, and subsequently for the construction of the permanent 
stabilizing scheme (passive buttresses) when both basins had to 
be fully emptied again. 
 
The wellpoints were continuously pumped through ejector 
heads installed on each well. To diminish the safety risks of 
pump breakdown or power failure, the wells were hooked up 
to three separately pump-operated heather pipes. This 
mechanical system reduced uplift by creating overlapping 
groundwater depression cones under the wall (Fig. 4), 
reducing uplift pressures to meet the desired factor of safety 
of 1.75 against wall sliding.  
 
Although successful as a temporary stabilizing method, it 
was decided that future draining of the basins could be better 
achieved by a passive and simpler system to increase the 
factors of safety. Such a passive system would replace the 
active dewatering used during the first cleaning of the 
reservoir basins. The active system used to perform the first 
cleaning and subsequently to build the permanent stabilizing 
scheme, entailed considerable monitoring and round-the-
clock maintenance to perform the necessary work within 
acceptable risk levels. The use of this active system for 
future dewatering and cleaning was deemed too costly and 
complex for permanent operations, and its replacement by a 
permanent, risk-free, passive system was highly desirable. 
The passive system entailed concrete buttresses acting as 
wall toe support. They were designed to aid the dividing wall 
to withstand the maximum operating level plus two feet of 
surcharge in one basin during the time the other basin is fully 
drained and empty. 
 
 
DIVIDING WALL BUTTRESSES 
 
The toe supports provided a permanent passive system that 
consists of mass-concrete buttresses built along both sides of 
the wall to add to the frictional resistance of the wall. The 
buttresses also aid the wall against potential overturning. 
Uplift under the wall and buttress is controlled by 
longitudinal gravel-filled underdrains built into the new toe 
supports. These underdrains run along the toes of the original 
wall, and act as seepage collectors. The gravel underdrains, 
which are 6 feet in width, are wrapped in geotextile fabric. 
The fabric acts as a filter to prevent migration of fines from 
under the wall foundation from seepage flow. A 12-inch 
diameter perforated PVC collector pipe runs along the full 
length of the drain and discharges at two valved outlets. 
When the basin is empty, the valves are opened for drain 
seepage water to discharge into the empty basin through a 
sump pit. The valve operating wheels are accessible by a 
ladder from the top of the dividing wall to the top of the 
buttress at El. 270 ft, and an aluminum platform walkway to 
the valve wrench location. 
 
Fig. 4. Foundation Dewatering and Observation Wells. 
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The buttresses were built in 60-foot long monoliths, of non-
reinforced concrete poured in two lifts of approximately 6 
and 5.5 feet in height each. The horizontal lifts were 
provided with two longitudinal keys. Vertical expansion 
joints between monoliths were provided with two vertical 
keys. Buttress monoliths were constructed in a checkerboard 
pattern (Fig. 5). The buttresses were not structurally 
connected to the dividing wall and are 16 feet wide at their 
base and 11.5 ft high, and are founded on the existing 6-inch 
thick bottom concrete slab. Each buttress took approximately 
two and one-half months to complete and a placed total mass 
concrete volume of 25,000 cyds per buttress. The final 
modified wall section is shown in Fig. 6 below. 
 
 
Factors of Safety of the Buttressed Wall 
 
The factors of safety considered for the stability of the 
dividing wall were (1) stability against sliding and (2) 
stability against overturning. The first is obtained by the sum 
of the net frictional resistance along the base of the wall and 
buttress over the driving forces. The stability against 
overturning is assured by keeping the resultant of all forces 
close or within the middle third of the wall base. The 
buttresses were designed and dimensioned to satisfy these 
two stability considerations. It was found, however, that the 
stability against sliding is the controlling mode of failure. 
Given the possibility of leakage from the basins through 
buttress expansion joints and other seepage paths into the 
buttress underdrain, it was assumed that hydrostatic 
pressures in the soil beneath the wall are related to the water 
level in each basin. Thus, when the water level in one basin 
is lower than the other basin and the wall is functioning as a 
dam, the hydrostatic pressure in the soil at the heel of the 
wall (the side of the wall with higher water level) along the 
buttress underdrain, was assumed equal to the height of water 
above the heel multiplied by the unit weight of water. 
Furthermore, the hydrostatic pressure at the toe of the wall 
(the side of the wall with the lower water level) was assumed 
equal to the height of water above the toe underdrain 
multiplied by the unit weight of water. Therefore, for the 
stability analyses the uplift distribution was considered to 
have a trapezoidal distribution when one basin is partially 
dewatered and a triangular distribution when one basin is 
completely empty. Flow net analyses results confirmed that 
the assumed distributions were conservative (Fig.7). 
 
In view of the risk and potential consequences of failure of 
the wall would have in the water supply system, the 
minimum factor of safety against sliding for one basin empty 
and the other in operation with a water level at El. 295 ft was 
set at 1.75 with the by-pass aqueduct within the wall full of 
water. The minimum factor of safety without water in the 
aqueduct is 1.63. Both factors of safety were considered 
adequate for future dewatering of the basins. 
 
A stability test was performed on the east basin buttress after 
its construction completion and before filling the basin. The 
test was carried out over a 5-day period to assess the 
foundation response to uplift pressures created by the west 
basin, which was in service. The results are summarized in a 
graphical display (Fig. 8, next page) of typical uplift pressure 
distributions, with their associated factors of safety, which 
can be expected in the future. Although the west basin 
buttress was not tested, a similar uplift distribution pattern is 
expected to occur in the future when the west side of the 
reservoir is out of service and the east basin is operational. 
 
The test results show that for an operating level of the in-
service basin equal to 293 ft, the average factor of safety of 
the wall against sliding is 2.07, with the lowest value of 1.90 
at an instrumented section at the south side of the wall. The 
calculated factors of safety were for the empty aqueduct 
condition, which was the case during the test. The uplift 
response at the section with highest readings (section 
1R/P2u, at the south side of the wall) was extrapolated for an 


































Fig.6. Dividing Wall & Permanent Concrete Buttresses
Fig.5. Buttress Construction in Checkerboard Fashion
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For that condition, the anticipated factor of safety was 
calculated to be 1.81 for the aqueduct full of water condition, 
1.69 for the empty aqueduct. Both values are above the 
minimum design values. 
 
The graphical presentation below shows the measured 
distribution of uplift under the wall during the test period 
compared to the maximum theoretical distributions. Factors 
of safety are shown for three typical sections. Piezometric 




Discussion of Factors of Safety 
 
The active dewatering system used to lower the uplift 
pressures under the dividing wall during cleaning and 
construction of the buttresses was essential to maintain 
adequate factors of safety against sliding of the wall when 
one basin is completely empty. Without it, the wall could 
have failed. The computed factor of safety of the wall, using 
a 2D analysis, without the uplift control is less than one. By 
installing the foundation dewatering system described earlier 
and limiting the maximum operating level to between two 
and three feet below the maximum El. 295 ft, it was possible 
to increase the average factor of safety of the wall to a value 
of 1.7±. Thus, the stability techniques used during these 
operations reduced the risk of failure to an acceptable level. 
Although the temporary system provided stability as long as 
the system was working, any serious breakdown of the 
system, such as freezing during cold weather, loss of power 
from the primary grid, or failure of the backup power 
generator, could have seriously jeopardized safe conditions 
of the work in the empty basin. Therefore, there was a desire 
to find a permanent solution regarding the stability of the 
wall during all future basin emptying that would not impose 
limitations of the maximum water level in the in-service 
basin and at the same time provide an acceptable factor of 
safety via a more passive and simplified system.  
 
This was a particularly pressing consideration for the 
possible construction of a concrete cover over the reservoir, 
which would entail keeping each basin empty for 
considerable periods of time. The inherit risk of an active 
system together with restrictions of reservoir level in the 
active basin to ensure the dividing wall stability was 
unacceptable. This goal was accomplished by replacing the 
active dewatering system with passive supports, i.e., 
stabilizing buttresses, on each side of the wall. The benefits 
obtained in stability with the addition of the concrete 
buttresses is clear, and is summarized below in terms of new 
permanent factors of safety of the wall. The risk of failure 
has been virtually eliminated by these new structures. The 
quoted factors of safety in Table 1 are for the case when one 
basin is empty and the other is operating at a maximum water 
level equal to 295 ft. Values have been calculated both for 
the case with the by-pass aqueduct in operation and full with 
water and the empty case. 
 
Table 1. New Computed Factors of Safety 
 
New Factors of Safety of the Dividing 
Wall 
Uplift Conditions 






Full 1.75 1.44 1.33 
Empty 1.65 1.33 1.21 
 
(*) Triangular distribution. The full hydrostatic head on in-
service basin side of the wall dissipates linearly from the heel 
to the toe of the wall base. 
(**) Full hydrostatic head of the in-service basin extends to the 
wall base centerline and dissipates thereafter linearly to the toe. 
(***) Full hydrostatic head of the in-service basin extends to 
the toe-end of horizontal portion of the wall base and 
dissipates thereafter linearly to the wall toe. 
 
Uplift distributions during testing of the east basin buttress 
all fell below the normal triangular distribution. Thus, higher 
calculated factors of safety were actually obtained during the 
test. The west buttress has not been tested, but is expected to 
behave satisfactorily and similar to the east buttress based on 
the piezometric response gained during the full dewatering of 





The embankment is approximately 8,500 feet long following 
an oval shape. The inner slope is 2H to 1V extending from 
El. 258.5 ft above mean sea level, which is the bottom of the 
reservoir, to the embankment crest at El. 300 ft. The slope is 
interrupted at about mid-height, El. 280 ft, by a 10-foot wide 
bench. The lower portion of the slope is concrete lined. 
Above El. 280, the side slopes of the embankment rise 
generally at about 2.5 H to 1V; however, there are some 
portions of the embankment with steeper slopes. Above the 
    Uplifts under 
Base of Dividing Wall
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bench the slope is covered by hand-placed stones up to about 
two feet in size, followed by dumped riprap with stones 
typically between four and fifteen inches in size to El. 297 ft. 
Grass covers the remaining top portion of the slope. The 
concrete liner from El. 280 to the toe of slope is 8 inches 
thick and is provided with pattern weepholes (eight 
weepholes per joint and joints are typically 8 ft apart). The 
upper section of the slope above the bench is free draining.  
 
The embankment was constructed with two fill zones. The 
inner portion of the embankment was built of special 
impervious fill, which consists of screened Glacial Till 
obtained directly from the excavation of the reservoir. It was 
placed in 4-inch lifts and compacted with 10-ton sheepfoot 
rollers. The outer slope or stabilizing shoulder, the ordinary 
embankment zone, was built of unsorted Glacial Till and less 
compacted then the impervious zone; see Fig. 9.  
 
The stability of the inner embankment slope during 
drawdown of the basins was also a concern. During 
drawdown of the reservoir, the water contained within the 
select fill will slowly drain from the embankment into the 
Glacial Till beneath and reservoir. The rate of drainage and 
pore-pressure dissipation in the select fill of the inner slope is 
a function of the reservoir drawdown rate, properties of the 
materials and efficiency of the weepholes in the concrete 
lined lower slope. The rate of drawdown was studied 
theoretically by means of flow nets and integrated stability 
analyses.  
 
The east basin was the first to be dewatered. For this basin an 
initial rate of 6 inches per 24 hours was adopted. It was 
found that for that rate the lowest acceptable factor of safety 
of the slope of 1.25 occurred when the pool had been 
drawdown 26 feet to about El. 265 ft, i.e., and a remaining 
pool depth of about 7 feet. To verify the analyses and 
confirm that the adopted rates of drawdown were acceptable, 
five instrumented sections were installed on each the east and 
west rim embankments. The instrumented sections were 
about 700 ft apart and entailed the installation of three 
pneumatic piezometers 5 to 10 feet deep into the reservoir 
side slope. The need of deeper piezometer tips was not 
necessary since all stability analyses indicated rather shallow 
failures entailing the lower portions of the slope below the 
10-foot bench. Therefore, one was installed in the El. 280 ft 
mid-height 10-foot bench, the second on the 2H:1V slope, 
typically at about half the slope height, and a third one a few 
feet from the toe of the embankment slope in the Glacial Till 
under the bottom slab. These piezometers were read on a 
daily basis and the data was used as input to check 
drawdown analyses and compared with residual pore 
pressures obtained from the drawdown model. The 
piezometric heads were used to run fresh stability analyses 
on a daily basis to ascertain the slope safety and the 
adjustment of the adopted drawdown rates, if any, to ensure 
adequate pore-pressure dissipation to maintain slope safety. 
 
The shear strength parameters used in the embankment slope 
stability were obtained from triaxial testing of undisturbed 
samples taken during the site investigations executed for the 
purpose of strength investigations of the embankment 
materials. A friction angle of 39 degrees was obtained from 
the tests. Friction angles adopted in the stability analyses 
were between 36 and 39 degrees. Triaxial test results also 
served to confirm and validate the friction angle used in the 
foundation material under the dividing wall. Shear resistance 
values for the outer slope material and intact Glacial Till 
were derived from SPT blow counts.  
 
Based on daily checks on pore-pressure dissipation and 
stability runs it was decided to increase the drawdown rate of 
the east basin to 9 inches per day. This would shorten the 
time needed to empty the basin and increase the time 
available to clean the basin before the coming summer 
season starting around the beginning of June of each year, 
when both basins need to be fully operational to meet the 
warm/hot water demands of the city. Calculated factors of 
safety for the most critical pool level of around El. 268 ft 
were 1.20 at one of the instrumented sections without 

















Fig. 9. Typical Embankment Section with Fill Materials 
Fig. 10. Embankment Phreatic Change under Drawdown
EAST BASIN DRAWDOWN
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From the experience learned at the east basin and 
piezometric measurements taken during the initial favorable 
response of drawdown at the west basin, together with the 
knowledge that negative pore-pressures that develop due to 
shear strain in the slope will increase the shear resistance, it 
was decided to drawndown the west basin at a rate of 12-inch 
per day. Periodic pore pressure measurements at five 
instrumented slope sections confirmed that the adopted 
drawdown rate was safe. The rate increase from 9 to 12 
inches in 24 hours created a saving of 10 days.  
 
Figure 11 shows the adopted drawdown rate at the east basin 
during second emptying for the construction of the east wall 
buttress. The figure also shows the response of the 
piezometer installed at mid height of the lower slope. The 
drawdown rate adopted this time around was 12 inches in 24 
hours. The behavior and calculated factors of safety were 
satisfactory and no distress was observed on the slope or at 
the 10-foot bench. From the experience gained during 
emptying each basin twice it was concluded that a maximum 
safe drawdown rate for both basins should not exceed 12 





Extensive monitoring was performed during the emptying of 
the basins. From the start of basin drawdown to putting the 
basin back in-service 
took approximately 
4.5 months. During 
that period of time 
and in agreement 
with the client’s 
request, surveillance 
and comprehensive 




seven days a week. 




of the top of the wall 




on each wall monolith and daily readings of crackmeters to 
an accuracy of 1 mm installed across the monolith expansion 
joints formed part of the monitoring effort. Twice-daily 
manual readings of the observation wells installed along the 
wall at 12 sections were performed to cross-check the 
automated readings stored in a data acquisition system. 
However, as mentioned above, pressure transducers installed 
near the bottom of the wells read pressures continuously and 
the automatic readout unit was hooked up to an alarm system 
with speakers at both intake and downtake chambers. The 
trigger levels were set based on water levels measured in the 
observation wells that could pose risks to the wall stability. 
In the event of such occurrences, the in-service basin level 
would be lowered through available overflow facilities in the 
downtake building to lower uplift pressures and maintain 
adequate safety factors. 
 
The 6-inch reservoir bottom slab was monitored for potential 
displacement using geophysical survey techniques that 
included echo-sounding and high-resolution side scan sonar. 
The bottom slab performance to uplift pressures was carried 
out daily by profiling the basin floor along established track 
lines, parallel to the dividing wall, at a spacing of 
approximately 50 feet on center. The physical collection of 
data from a small vessel was usually performed in the 
mornings and the analysis, evaluation and graphical 
presentation of data was done in the afternoon and discussed 
with the engineers. 
 
The embankment slopes were checked by measuring 
piezometric levels at the various installed piezometers. 
Readings were performed twice a day and stability of the 
slopes was updated daily using measured pore water 
pressures. 
 
In addition, the dividing wall was visually inspected every 
two hours and the inner reservoir slope at 4-hour intervals by 
walking along the exposed mid-slope bench. 
 
There were weekly briefing meetings at the site with the 
various client’s divisions, namely design, construction and 
operations as well as the consulting engineering team 
involved and invited guests to review the wall stability and 
its performance as well as the rim embankment behavior and 
change in the course of action if required. In great part the 
success achieved can be attributed to very open channels of 
communications among the parties involved, and the overall 
appreciation by all of the interest and technical challenge 
needed to accomplish a successful operation within tolerable 





The authors are indebted to the many engineers who helped 
and dedicated long hours in the monitoring effort during the 
dewatering of the basins. In addition, special thanks goes to 
the water distribution operators of the facility. Recognition is 
given to the contractors for their understanding and handling 
the complexity of the issues at hand.  
 
Credit for the endeavor undertaken goes to: 
 
Owner: New York City Department of Environmental 
Protection. 
Consultants: Malcolm Pirnie Inc., of White Plains, New 
York and TAMS Consultants, Inc., of New York City. 
Contractors: Grow Gottlieb of New York and New Jersey. 
Moretrench American Corp., of New Jersey. 
Warren George, Inc., of New Jersey. 
Roctest, Inc. of Canada. 
Ocean Survey, Inc., of Old Saybrook, Connecticut. 
Fig. 12. Dividing Wall Monitoring 
Station for Wall Uplift 
